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ABSTRACT 
The rapid growth of  efficient tools, which   generate and edit  digital images demands effective methods for 
assuring integrity of images. A semi-fragile block-based image authentication technique is proposed which can 
not only localize the alteration detections but also recover the missing contents. The proposed technique  
distinguishes content-preserving  manipulations from the content alterations using secure image hashing instead 
of cryptographic hashing. The original image is divided into large blocks (sub-images) which are also divided 
into 8×8 blocks. Secure image hashing is utilized  to generate the sub-image hash (signature) which may slightly 
change when the content-preserving  manipulations are applied. Furthermore, the sub-image code is generated 
using the JPEG compression scheme.  Then, two sub-image hash copies and the sub-image code are embedded 
into relatively-distant sub-images using a doubly linked chain which prevents the vector quantization attack. The 
hash  and code bits are robustly embedded in chosen discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients exploiting a 
property of DCT coefficients which is invariant before and after JPEG compression. The experimental results 
show that the proposed technique can successfully both localize and compensate the content alterations.  
Furthermore, it can effectively thwart many attacks such as vector quantization attacks. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The current advances in information technology, the 
widespread multimedia applications and wireless 
services require efficient methods for guaranteeing 
privacy, security, protection and integrity of the 
assorted multimedia data categories. Since many 
recently developed devices and efficient software 
products offer consumers worldwide capabilities of 
flexibly creating, manipulating, and exchanging 
multimedia data, considerable efforts and  
contributions have been lately made on digital 
watermarking that inserts a piece of information (the 
watermark) into multimedia (host/cover) data for 
many purposes such as [Has04, Has07, Won01]: 
image authentication, copyright protection, 
fingerprinting, broadcast monitoring and data hiding. 
For example, in medical archiving and e-commerce, 
we strongly desire to be sure that the images are 
genuine and in the news reporting, it is important that 
the image truthfully reflects the real view at the time 
of capture [Lan99, Won01]. For image authentication 
purposes, it is required that the watermarking 
algorithm is blind, secure and so sensitive that slight 
modifications to the image content are detected and 
precisely localized [Lin99,Yeu97]. Fragile [Won98, 
Bar02, Cel02], semi-fragile [Eki04, Lin00, Lin01a, 
Lin07, Mae06], self-recovery/embedding [Fri99b, 
Lin01b, Lue08, Wan08] watermarking schemes have 
recently been presented for image authentication. 
Fragile image authentication schemes are so sensitive 
to pixel changes where their watermarks are easily 
damaged even in case of harmless changes in the 
image data due to content-preserving manipulations 
that do not affect the content [Lin99]. Hence, fragile  
image authentication is applicable and of interest only 
in case of lossless environment, i.e., coding, storage, 
transmission (of the watermarked image). The 
fundamental objective of the attacker facing such 
fragile watermark is to keep a watermark that makes 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of 
this work for personal or classroom use is granted without 
fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for 
profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this 
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otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to 
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his/her altered or completely forged image, “pass” the 
verification test as authentic [Has04, Has07, Lue08]. 
Block-based fragile/semi-fragile image authentication 
schemes provide attack localization but they are 
vulnerable to vector quantization (VQ) attacks 
[Hol00], relying on that the watermark 
embedding/verification processes are run on 
independent blocks. Once an attacker has a table of 
authenticated blocks (with the same security 
parameters), he/she can use the best-authenticated 
approximation of an un-authenticated block without 
having the verification process detecting his/her 
alterations. This type of attack principally differs from 
the attacks against copyright protection and 
information hiding where the attacker may mainly 
want to significantly distort or remove the watermark 
with imperceptible alterations in the image [Kut00, 
Kir02].  
Various global and block-based (sized down to pixel-
wise) fragile image authentication methods have been 
developed. A simple fragile scheme simply replaces 
the least significant bits (LSBs) of the image of 
interest with the checksum (i.e., modulo-2 addition) 
bits of a long word of some most significant bits 
(MSBs) [Lin99]. In [Yeu97], the use of a user-defined 
color look-up tables (LUTs) guided pixel-wise 
adjustment to embed the watermark is proposed. 
Wong’s block-based method [Won97] and its public-
key modified versions [Won98, Won01] replace the 
LSBs of each block with a signature of its MSBs, 
with the image size, image index and/or block index, 
xor-ed with its corresponding watermark block.  
On the other hand, semi-fragile image authentication 
techniques  embed watermarks so robustly to survive 
(to some, application dependent, extend) various 
kinds of typical image processing manipulations such 
as lossy compression as long as the image contents 
are preserved. At the same time, embedded 
watermarks must detect malicious alterations such as 
deleting or adding an object. In many semi-fragile 
schemes, the relations between pairs of discrete 
cosine transform (DCT) coefficients in a block are 
used as the block  signature. Then, the signatures 
(watermarks) are robustly embedded in low frequency 
coefficients [Lin00, Lin01a]. In [Mae06], the authors 
introduce two methods to generate the signatures 
using the discrete wavelet transform (DWT). In the 
first method, random values are added to the 
difference between two coefficients before the 
difference is encoded to generate the signature bit. 
The second method proposes the use of a multiple 
nonuniform quantizer  to encode the coefficient 
difference in each  pair. Lin et. al. use the differences 
of DCT coefficients as signatures and modify other 
DCT coefficients to match the signatures [Lin07].   
Furthermore, to not only localize altered regions but 
also compensate for the damage, self-recovery/  
embedding image authentication techniques have 
been presented that embed an image approximation 
into the image itself in a fragile [Lue08, Wan08] or 
semi-fragile [Has07, Fri99a] way using various 
techniques. 
An original self-recovery/embedding image 
authentication technique based on JPEG compression 
has been introduced in [Fri99b]. A JPEG compressed 
version of each block  is inserted into the LSBs of 
the block 
B
PB
v+ , where Pv  is a vector of length 
approximately 1/3 of the image size, with a randomly 
chosen direction. The algorithm limitations and 
possible attacks are addressed in [Fri99c, Lue08]. In 
[Lin01b], Lin and Chang  have proposed  an 
algorithm using quantized coefficients of the DCT of 
the image blocks as a watermark and modifying the 
coefficients differences to match the quantized 
coefficients (watermark). The attacker can easy 
defeat the verification process  applying the same 
algorithm into a fake image. Instead of using a JPEG 
compression version as an image approximation, 
Wang and Tsai  have used  fractal codes of a ROI 
(region of interest), which is chosen as the important 
object in the host image [Wan08]. On the other hand, 
Lue et al. proposed a technique that uses a halftone 
version of the host image as an approximation image 
[Lue08].  
In this paper, image hashing technology,  which will 
be described in the next sections in details  is utilized 
to generate the sub-image signature. A code of the 
approximated sub-image is computed using the 
principals of JPEG compression. Then, the sub-image 
signature copies and the sub-image code are robustly 
embedded into DCT coefficients of  two relatively-
distant sub-images making a doubly linked chain.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
cryptographic hashing, which is mostly used to 
generate image/block signature in fragile algorithms, 
and image hashing, which  we adopt to generate the 
proposed signatures, are described in Section 2. In 
Section 3, existing image hashing schemes are 
presented. The proposed technique is introduced in 
Section 4. Experimental results are shown in Section 
5. In Section 6, the conclusion is presented. 
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING AND 
IMAGE HASHING  
The cryptographic hash functions such as MD4, 
MD5, and SHA  [Men01, Sch96] map the input data 
to a short fixed length  string. For the hash function 
Hc and the input data d, it should be easy to compute 
the hash hc=Hc(d). For this type of functions, called 
one-way-functions, it is too hard to estimate the input 
data d from the hash hc.  Hash functions have, at least, 
the following  additional properties  [Men01, Sch96]: 
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 Given the hash hc, it is computationally infeasible 
to find an input which hashes to that output, i.e. it 
is hard to find d such that Hc(d)=hc. 
 Given the data d, it is hard to find another input 
data d0 which hashes to the same output, i.e. it is 
hard to find Hc(d)=Hc(d0). 
 It is computationally infeasible to find any two 
inputs d0 and d1 which have the same output (i.e., 
satisfying collision resistance). 
It is clear that the cryptographic hash  is so sensitive 
to changes in the input data where small changes, 
even a single bit, dramatically change (~50%) the 
output. To secure the hash, it may be encrypted by an 
encryption algorithm. The cryptographic hash is 
mostly used for digital signatures and fragile image 
authentication. 
On the other hand, the image (visual) hash function  
H  maps the input image (or sub-image) to an output 
h=H(I) that is invariant under perceptually 
insignificant  image changes with the following main 
properties[Fri00, Mih01, Swa06, Ven00, Tan08]: 
 It is hard to find two different images having the 
same or very close hash  value(s) (collision 
resistance). 
 Given h, perceptual changes to an image I  lead 
to a different hash  H(I') ≠ H(I). 
 The hash is key dependent, for security reasons, 
so that different keys give significantly different 
hash values. 
The main difference between image (visual) and 
cryptographic hashing is that image hashing accepts  
perceptually insignificant changes in the input image 
with  small hash changes; but small changes in the 
input data lead to very significant changes in the 
cryptographic hash. 
3. IMAGE HASHING SCHEMES 
In [Fri00], The image hash is generated by projecting 
the  input image onto patterns which are generated 
using a zero-mean uniform distributed  key random 
generator. The resulting hash is resilient to many 
normal operations but it is not collision free [Swa06]. 
Venkatesan et al. have introduced an image hashing 
algorithm that uses the discrete wavelet transform 
(DWT) of an image. Statistics of each subband block 
are calculated, randomly quantized and encoded to 
generate the final hash value [Ven00]. Unfortunately, 
the algorithm does not work  well for object insertion. 
In [Mih01], the DWT is employed to capture the 
image hash based on threshoding and iterative 
filtering. Swaminathan et al. [Swa06] have exploited 
the Fourier-Mellin transform to generate  image 
features. In the polar coordinate, the summation of 
image values alone angle axis  at equal distant points 
for a specific radius is an image feature. The image 
features for radii are represented as the image hash.  
In [Tan08], a robust image hash algorithm uses a non-
negative matrix factorization (NMF) scheme for 
generating the image hash. First, the image undergoes 
preprocessing as a sequence of image resizing, color 
space conversion and low-pass filtering.  The 
preprocessed image is then divided into unequal 
blocks. Next, each block is rescaled to a fixed size 
and put as a vector in a matrix that is undergone 
NMF. The elements of the NMF coefficient matrix 
are quantized and encoded to generate the image 
hash. We use this algorithm to generate the sub-image 
signature in our proposed image authentication 
technique. So, we describe it in more details in the 
rest of this section. The scheme is composed of the 
following four main steps:  
 
First step: Image preprocessing 
a- The image is  resized to q×q using bi-linear 
interpolation. 
b- The color space of q×q image is converted to 
YCbCr. 
c- The Y plane is passed through a low-pass filter. 
Second step: Building the secondary image 
a- The preprocessed image U is randomly 
divided into t strips, and each strip is again 
divided into t blocks with varied sizes, 
resulting in t2=Nb blocks in total. 
b- Each block is resized to k×k using bi-linear 
interpolation. 
c- Each k×k block is stacked to construct a k2×1 
vector v. 
d- Each vector v is used as a column in a pseudo-
random order to form the m×n matrix V, 
where m=k2. V is called the secondary image. 
Third step: Data reduction 
a- V undergoes NMV giving the  coefficient 
matrix C  (see the appendix). 
b- C entries are quantized to generate a binary 
matrix Cb as follow: 
 
  (1) 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ >
≤=
+
+
1,,
1,,
, ,1
,0
jljl
jljlb
jl cc
cc
c
 
where cl,j denotes the entry of C in the lth row and the 
jth column , and cl,n+1 = cl,1. 
Final step: Hash security 
a- Cb entries are concatenated to form a binary 
string. 
b- The binary string is interleaved using a  key to 
produce a key-dependent image hash h. 
4. PROPOSED TECHNIQUE 
Image hashing is employed to generate the sub-
images' hashes (signatures) which are used to check 
the authenticity of an image. Two signature copies of 
each sub-image are robustly embedded into two 
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relatively distant sub-images which are pseudo- 
randomly  chosen  using a doubly  linked chain in low  
frequency DCT coefficients. In the proposed 
technique,  the  image  of interest  is divided  into sub- 
images. The sub-image hash (signature) is computed 
using the secure image  hashing algorithm [Tan08] 
and the sub-image code, which represents the 
approximated sub-image is generated using the JPEG 
compression principles. Then, the sub-image hash 
copies and the sub-image code are robustly inserted 
into relatively distant sub-images. In the next 
subsections, the embedding and the verification 
processes are described  in details. 
Embedding Process 
The original M×N image I is divided into m'×n' sub-
images as follows: 
 
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤{ }'' /,/2,21,22,11,1 ...,,,...,,, nNmMSISISISISII =  (2) 
where m' mod 8=0 and n' mod 8=0,  is the floor of 
x. For each sub-image SIi,j, the sub-image hash hi,j is 
computed using the  secure image hashing algorithm 
[Tan08] such that: 
⎡ ⎤x
 
  (3) )( ,, jiji SIHh =
 
To compute the sub-image code  , the sub-image 
SIi,j is resized to 8×8. Then, the resized sub-image is 
undergone the DCT. The DCT coefficients are 
quantized using the quantization table which 
corresponds to 50% quality JPEG compression. Then, 
the quantized coefficients are encoded using a fixed 
bit allocation table to generate the sub-image code. 
S
jiC ,
Each sub-image is divided into 8×8 blocks  as follow: 
 
 { }ji
nm
jiji
ji bbbSI
,
8/,8/
,
2,1
,
1,1, ''.....,,,=  (4) 
 
Two hash copies and the code of each sub-image are 
robustly inserted  and spread into two relatively 
distant sub-images generating a doubly linked chain. 
In the color images, we use the Y channel of the 
YCbCr color space for embedding the hash copies and 
codes. The choice of the two relatively distant sub-
images depends on the sub-image index and it is 
controlled by secret keys as follows: 
[ ] [[ ]3/2,3/)(,1mod))(( 111 ssksk MMjGMjGii ∈ ]++=   [ ] [[ ]3/2,3/)(,1mod))(( 12121 ssksk NNiGNiGjj ∈ ]++=   [ ] [[ ]3/2,3/)(,1mod))(( 332 ssksk MMjGMjGii ∈ ]++= [ ] [[ ]3/2,3/)(,1mod))(( 24242 ssksk NNiGNiGjj ∈ ]++=
                                                                                (5) 
 
where Gk1, Gk2, Gk3  and Gk4 are key seed random 
generators with   keys k1, k2, k3 and k4. Ms and Ns 
are the number of sub-images per column and row, 
respectively.  
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of the indices of the first 
relatively distant sub-image  for each sub-image after 
Gk1(j)  column-wise circular shifts followed by Gk2(i1) 
row-wise circular shifts.   
Then, each block of distant sub-images is transformed 
to the frequency domain using the DCT. We robustly 
embed two hash copies of the sub-image and the sub-
image code (sub-image approximation) into the two 
relatively distant sub-images. One copy is embedded 
into the first distant sub-image blocks and the other 
copy into the second distant sub-image blocks. 
Furthermore, we divide the sub-image code into two 
groups which are embedded into the two distance 
sub-images. For embedding a bit of a sub-image hash 
copy or a bit of a sub-image code, we use a proved 
theorem given in [Lin00]. The theorem explains that 
if a DCT coefficient is quantized by Qqf(v) (qf refers 
to the compression quality factor), this coefficient can 
be reconstructed after JPEG compression with qf1>qf. 
Depending on this theorem, we can embed a bit into a 
DCT coefficient using an arbitrary quantization step 
and we can also recover this bit even if JPEG 
compression is applied with a quality factor greater 
than the quality factor, which is used  in the 
embedding operation. Therefore, if we arrange the 
DCT coefficients of a block in zigzag order , the 
chosen coefficient of the block , which has an 
index (u,v) in the sub-image SI
ji
vub
,
,
i,j, is modified as 
follows : 
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where  is the modified block, Qm is the  specific 
quantization table, [x] is the round of x, l is the chosen 
middle frequency  coefficient index, t is the  hash 
index, sign(x) is equal 1 if x is a positive value and it 
is -1 if x is a negative value. Using (6), we can embed 
the bits of the hash and also the bits of the code  into 
low frequency coefficients, which have pre-specific 
indices. A sub-image hash copy and the first group of 
the code are embedded into chosen coefficients of the 
ji
vumb
,
,
        Gk1(j) 3 2 4 2 4 3 2 4  Gk2(i1)         
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  25 34 19 36 21 30 39 24  2 30 39 24 25 34 19 36 21
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16  33 42 27 44 29 38 47 32  3 29 38 47 32 33 42 27 44
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24  41 50 35 52 37 46 55 40  4 52 37 46 55 40 41 50 35
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  49 2 43 4 45 54 7 48  2 54 7 48 49 2 43 4 45
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40  1 10 51 12 53 6 15 56  4 12 53 6 15 56 1 10 51
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48  9 18 3 20 5 14 23 8  3 5 14 23 8 9 18 3 20
49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56  17 26 11 28 13 22 31 16  2 22 31 16 17 26 11 28 13
(a)                           (b)                              (c) 
Figure 1. Example of the proposed scheme for 
choosing relatively-distant sub-images.            
 (a) Original sub-images.  (b) Sub-images after 
Gk1(j) column-wise circular shifts. (c) Sub-images 
after Gk2(i1) row-wise circular shifts. 
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first distant sub image blocks. This operation is 
repeated for embedding another copy of the sub-
image hash and the second group of the code into  
other chosen coefficients of the second distant sub-
image blocks.  After embedding the hashes and codes 
of all sub-images, the DCT coefficients are converted 
back to pixel integer domain. There is a possibility for 
losing some embedded bits by the rounding and 
truncation which are used for converting to the pixel 
domain.  Therefore, we use an iteration procedure to  
assure the embedded bits are exactly extracted from 
the authenticated image. 
 
Verification Process 
In the verification process, the alterations that may 
occur on an authenticated image are not only detected 
and localized but also repaired.  In the verification 
process, the test image I' is divided into sub-images 
and each sub-image hash  h'i,j is computed. For each 
sub-image SI'i,j, the corresponding distant sub-images 
indices are computed using (5). The embedded hash 
copy he1i,j  and the first group of the sub-image code 
are extracted from the first distant sub-image SI'i1,j1. A 
bit is  extracted as follows: 
 
 2mod
)(
)(
)(
1,1'
,1
, ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
lQ
lb
the
m
ji
vu
ji
 (7) 
 
where   is the block, which has an index (u,v), in 
the sub-image SI'
1,1'
,
ji
vub
i1,j1, and Qm(l) is the quantization 
step. The other hash copy he2i,j  and the second group 
of the code are  extracted by the same method from 
the second distant sub-image SI'i2,j2. The two groups 
of the code are combined together to be the extracted  
code Cei,j of the sub-image SI'i,j.  To evaluate the 
match of hashes, the normalized Hamming distance is 
used which is defined as: 
 
 ∑
=
−=
L
t
thth
L
hhd
1
)(2)(11)2,1(  (8) 
 
where L is the length of the  hash string. For each sub-
image, we compute the normalized Hamming distance 
between the computed and extracted hashes. The 
status of the sub-image STi,j (altered sub-image or not) 
is evaluated as follows:  
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where T is  a threshold, STi,j=0 if the sub-image SI'i,j is 
considered as an altered sub-image, otherwise STi,j=1. 
For each altered sub-image, the approximated original 
sub-image can be recovered if the two distance sub-
images of the concerned sub-image are not altered. 
Therefore, the reconstructed sub-image  is rebuilt 
as follows: 
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where LOST is a sub-image that is  marked as a lost 
sub-image, dec is a sub-image decoding method. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
To examine the robustness of the proposed technique, 
we consider the performance of it to JPEG 
compression and additive noise. The proposed system 
has been tested using  50 512×512 images. We firstly 
study the effects of JPEG compression with a range of 
quality factors. Then, the additive Gaussian noise 
effects are addressed. The size of the used sub-image 
is 32×32. To calculate the sub-image hash, the 
parameters are r=8, t=2  and k= 16. Thus, the hash 
length is 32 bits.  In the robustness tests of the 
proposed technique, the quantization table of 50% 
quality JPEG compression is used  as a predefined 
quantization table Qm. The chosen coefficients' 
indices of the first distant sub-image blocks are 
{(1,4),(4,1)} for embedding the hash copy and {(2,3), 
(3,2)} for embedding the first group of the code. For 
the second distant sub-image blocks, the chosen 
coefficients' indices are {(2,4),(4,2)} for the second 
hash copy and {(1,3),(3,1)} for the second group of 
the code. 
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Figure 2. Average Hamming distance between 
the computed and extracted hashes for various 
JPEG compression quality factors.
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 Figure 3. Average Hamming distance between 
the computed and extracted hashes for various 
Gaussian noise variances. 
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Fig. 2  illustrates that the average Hamming distance 
between the computed sub-image hash and extracted 
hashes recovered from the first distant sub-image and 
the second distant sub-image, respectively for various 
JPEG compression quality factors. 
The effects of the additive zero-mean Gaussian noise 
have also been tested. Fig. 3 shows  the average 
Hamming distance between the computed  sub-image 
hash and extracted hashes which are extracted from 
the first distant sub-image and the second distant sub-
image, respectively for various noise variances. From 
these figures, we observe that the normalized 
Hamming distance values are less than 9%. Thus, we 
can use this value as a threshold T.  
To validate the proposed technique, we test it to check 
its capability of detecting local malicious 
manipulations mixed with  JPEG compression. Fig. 4 
is the original image and the approximated image, 
which represents the codes of all sub-images is shown 
in Fig. 5. The correlation coefficient between the 
original (grayscale version) and approximated images 
is 0.9198 and the peak signal to noise ratio PSNR of 
the approximated image relative to original image is 
26.07 dB. The original image is authenticated using 
the proposed technique with the used quantization 
table  Qm of  70% quality JPEG compression to yield  
the image of Fig. 6. The correlation coefficient 
between the original and authenticated images is 
0.9982 and the PSNR of the authenticated image 
relative to the original image is 42.47 dB.  The 
authenticated image is altered by a local malicious 
attack. Then, it is undergone  80% quality JPEG 
compression to yield the image of Fig. 7. In Fig. 8, the 
proposed technique efficiently detects and localizes 
the content alterations. The proposed technique can 
not only localize the alteration detection but also 
successfully recover the missing contents as shown in 
Fig. 9. 
6. CONCLUSION 
A self-recovery semi-fragile image authentication 
technique is proposed which uses secure image 
hashing with improved localization. Using image 
hashing in the proposed technique to generate  
the signatures gives the proposed technique 
the capability to be robust against the normal 
operations such as JPEG compression and  
additive noise. To thwart the vector quantization 
attack, two sub-image hash copies and the sub-image 
code are securely embedded into two relatively distant 
sub-images. The experiment results explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Approximated image, correlation 
coefficient=0.9198, PSNR=26.07dB. 
Figure 6.  Authenticated image, correlation 
coefficient=0.9982, PSNR=42.47dB. 
 
Figure 7.  Altered version of the 
authenticated image. 
Figure 4.  Original image. 
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 that the proposed technique successfully 
distinguishes the normal manipulations such as JPEG 
compression  from malicious operations and precisely 
localizes the alteration detections. Moreover, the 
proposed technique can successfully compensate the 
missing contents. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Verification result marking the altered 
regions.  
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8. APPENDIX  
Non-negative matrix factorization  NMF  
In NMF, a non-negative matrix V  is factorized 
into  two matrices, B and C: 
 
  (11) CBV ≈
 
where B and C  are called  the base matrix and the 
coefficient matrix respectively. The factors C and B 
must be non-negative. 
If the size of V is m×n, the sizes of B and C are m×r 
and r×n, respectively. If r is chosen as less than m 
and n, NMF may be used for dimensionality 
reduction. 
To compute B and C, the following updating rules are 
applied [Tan08]: 
 
 ∑
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where i =1,2,...,m ;  j=1,2,...,n; l=1,2,...,r. 
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